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THE FEAR OF CRIME. By Richard Harris. New York: Prager
Inc. Pp. 100. $4.95
Mr. Richard Harris' little' book, The Fear of Crime,
portrays in colorful, compact style the workings of the United
States Senate, both in committee and on the floor, in the
hammering out of a major piece of legislation. The book concerns
itself with many of the legislative and political machinations
involved in the drafting and passage of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.2
Mr. Harris writes forthrightly about the bias of some of the
bill's sponsors, about their determination to discredit the Supreme
Court, and about their efforts to "lard the lean earth" 3 with
letters and testimony deftly drawn in major numbers from
"favorable" correspondents and witnesses. No holds are barred
by the author; he writes it as he believes it is and as he sees it.
Being a seasoned, experienced staff writer in the political scene for
the New Yorker for more than a decade, Mr. Harris spells out
with expertness and with undisguised candor the finesses, the
phony appeals, and the power plays to which the bill's sponsors
resorted in their legislative efforts.
If you are (and perhaps even if you are not) a member of Mr.
Harris' "unenlightened" public, you may feel strongly that you
are not, as he more than hints, misguided or ignorant, or both,
because you want something done about crimes of violence. You
may disagree, even fervently, with this unstated but fairly implied
thesis that crime must be permitted to flourish while society and
government tear out by the roots the" causes of crime, whether
these causes be economic, sociological, anthropological,
environmental, educational, or any combinations of these and
other factors. In fairness, I must say that I think Mr. Harris is
saying that if you are advocating that something be done about
crime and if by that advocacy you mean "do something even if
that something includes the deprivation of suspects' and others'
1. It is only 100 pages long, plus a twelve-page introduction by Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 370 et. seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
3. Shakespeare, The First Part of King Henry IV, Act I1, Sc. 2, Line 116.
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fundamental rights" you are, through fear of crime, inviting
totalitarian methods
The main thrust of The Fear of Crime is that the principal
senatorial sponsors of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act were attempting not to control crime but to show
congressional contempt for the Supreme Court's decisions in
criminal cases. With this objective, created by a dislike for
Supreme Court decisions in desegregation areas, these sponsors
preyed upon the fear of crime in the nation and engineered the
passage by Congress of the "Crime Bill" in an effort to
congressionally inteffere with the Supreme Court's decisions in
the criminal law field.5 And even if some of the provisions of this
"Crime Bill" may be found by the Court to be unconstitutional,
the effect on the Court, mused the sponsors, will be a loss of
prestige in the nation on account of the aversion of millions of
citizens to the "coddling of criminals." The end result may be,
so the reasoning goes, that either the Court will "see the light"
and voluntarily reduce its activism, or constitutional amendments
(to authorize "police state" methods) will be easier to effect, or
Presidents will continuously attempt to nominate for future Court
vacancies new members who are conservatives, non-activists, or,
idealogically, "law and order" individuals; in any of these events,
the prestige of the Supreme Court will be lessened.
As students of the history of our Supreme Court know, the
attempted discrediting of the Court by other branches of our
tripartite Federal government has occurred with fair frequency. At
thA onset of the 19th century the Jeffersonian Republicans,
disenchanted with the political viewpoint of the "holdover"
Supreme Court and particularly of the Chief Justice, John
Marshall, brought an impeachment action against Justice Samuel
Chase. Because of a split among the Jeffersonian Senators, the
vote was insufficient for conviction. Had Justice Chase been
impeached, undoubtedly John Marshall would have been the next
discredited victim. Thus, there was averted "as a matter of
practical political constitutional interpretation"' the impeachment
4. "He that is robb'd, not wanting what is stolen,
Let him not know't and he's not robb'd at all."
Shakesiieare, Othello, Act III, Sc. 3, Line 337.
5. "There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts."
Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, Sc. 2, Line 75.

6. J.W.

HURST, THE.GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW

(1950) p. 69.
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of a federal judge because of his political opinions, his views about
public policy, and his interpretations of laws.
In the late 1860's, the "radical" Congress had trouble with
the Supreme Court, especially in connection with the
constitutionality of reconstruction legislation pertaining to the
rebellious states. To prevent the Supreme Court from possibly
holding unconstitutional some sections of the Reconstruction Act,
Congress in 18681 withdrew the appellate jurisdication of the
Supreme Court in habeas corpus actions, one of which was then
pending in the Court. This case, Ex Parte McCardle, involved the
amenability of a civilian newspaper editor in Mississippi to trial
by military commission for publication of alleged incendiary and
libelous articles. While the case was in "midstream" in the
Supreme Court, Congress, utilizing the plain words of the
Constitution in Article III, Section 2,1 repealed the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such habeas corpus cases.
The Supreme Court, even though jurisdiction had already
attached in the case, dismissed McCardle's appeal for want of
jurisdiction. The Court said, inter alia, "We are not at liberty to
inquire into the motives of the legislature. . . . [T]he power to
make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given
by express words. .

.

. [J]udicial duty is not less fitly performed

by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that
which the Constitution and the laws confer."'"
Despite the Supreme Court's acceptance in Ex Parte
McCardle of the plain wording of the Constitution concerning the
power of the Congress to remove appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it can be argued that the purpose of the
"exception" clause in Article III, Section 2, was to give Congress
the authority to regulate the manner of bringing cases to the court
for appellate review in order to assure an orderly flow and not to
"destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the
7. Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44.
8. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
9. Article II of the Constitution of the United States, after vesting the judicial power
of the nation in the Supreme Court (and in subsequent inferior Federal courts established
by Congress), and after defining the scope of those cases and controversies to which the
judicial power shall extend, lists the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Then in the
second sentence of Article III, Section 2, the Constitution provides, "in all other cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
10. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514-15 (1869).
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constitutional plan."" Justice Douglas, dissenting in Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok, (a case in which the majority opinion referred to Ex
Parte MeCardle), said "There is a serious question whether the
McCardle case could command a majority view today.' 2 The
Supreme Court, indeed, has not been loath in the past twenty
years to overrule prior constitutional interpretations! On the other
hand, if the second clause of Article III, Section 2, is .interpreted
as one of the "checks and balances" which the framers placed,
like the Presidential veto, to provide some restraint by one arm
of the Federal government against one of the others, then the
"exception" clause is one way that Congress may validly remove
types of cases from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
A clearly appropriate way for Congress to try to overturn an
unwelcome constitutional decision by the Supreme Court is
through the amending process of article V of the Constitution.
This method, of course, is time-consuming and needs ratifying
action by the legislatures (or by conventions) of three-fourths of
3
the states.
Efforts of the President to counteract adverse constitutional
decisions by the Supreme Court, appear most dramatically in
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan of 1937.
Thwarted by some Supreme Court holdings concerning New Deal
legislation, President Roosevelt in February 1937, proposed to
Congress that it enact legislation to increase the number of
Federal judges, including those on the Supreme Court. In effect,
the President was striving to get his legislation sustained by
augmenting the Supreme Court with New Deal justices, who
hopefully would find his pet legislation consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. In any event, as President
Roosevelt announced to the nation in a "fire-side chat" the "...
plan will save our National Constitution from hardening of the
". The Senate Judiciary Committee
judicial arteries .
11. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953).
12. 370 U.S. 530, 605, n. I I (1962).
13. The Sixteenth Amendment giving Congress power "to lay and collect taxes on
income from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration" came as a result of the Court's finding
unconstitutional a Federal income tax law in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895).
14. Radio address by President Roosevelt, March 9, 1937.
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adversely reported upon President Roosevelt's proposed bill,
concluding, inter alia, that "It would subjugate the courts to the
will of Congress and the President and thereby destroy the
independence of the judiciary, the only certain shield of individual
rights. .

.

. Under the form of the Constitution it seeks to do that

which is unconstitutional . ..

Its ultimate operation would be to

make this government one of men rather than one of law. ..

."

In summary, I agree with Mr. Harris that the "Crime Bill"
contains some very undesirable provisions, especially in Title II of
the new law."6 Title II attempts, in Federal trials, to override
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court regarding
confessions17 and regarding identification of witnesses." The
legislative procedures, set out in Title II by Congress, in effect
violate the minimum constitutional standards announced by the
Supreme Court in the Miranda and the Wade cases. The Supreme
Court has from the beginning of the nation been the authority, in
the context of cases and controversies, to decide what the
Constitution means. For the Congress to promulgate legislation
which in substance says that the Constitution means something
different is "court-packing" with a fervor."9 The resulting clash
of the Congressional act's permissiveness with the Supreme
Court's prior determination of constitutional restrictions will be
detrimental to the administration of justice. In advance of such a
clash, responsible citizens should look on Title II of the "Crime
Bill" as a symbol of reckless action by Congress in derogation of
constitutional ways to change the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Constitution.!'
George W. Hickman, Jr.*
15. S. REP. No. 711, .75th

CONG.,

ist Sess. (1937) (Reorganization of the Federal

Judiciary-Adverse Report of the Committee on the Judiciary).
16. Any thoughtful citizen must also be aware of the awesome potentiality of the

invasion of privacy which is possible, even with its safeguards, under the provisions of Title
Ill of the "Crime Bill". Title I II deals with wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. United-States v. wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
19. "This is very midsummer madness." Shakespeare, Twelfth-Night, Act Ill, Sc.
4, Line 62.
20. "It is not nor it cannot come to good." Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Sc. 2, Line
158.
* B.S., U.S. Military Academy; L.L.B., Harvard; Member, Washington, D.C. Bar;
Professor of Law, University of San Diego, School of Law.

